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Franchisees' Optimism Bias and the Inefficiency
of the FTC Franchise Rule
Uri Benoliel* and Jenny Buchan**
A seminal assumption that underlies current franchise law is that
franchisees are intrinsically rational. As such, franchisees are presumed
to be able to rationally assess the risks involved in the franchise contract
and avoid those risks. Based on this rationality assumption, current law
is predominantly based on the FTC Franchise Rule, in which
franchisors are obliged to disclose to franchisees information regarding
future risks. Equipped with this information, franchisees, as rational
actors, are assumed to be capable of protecting themselves against the
franchise risks.
This Article questions the validity of the assumption that franchisees
are rational actors. Based on a significant body of existing empirical
research, which has thus far been overlooked in the legal debate over
the FTC Franchise Rule, this Article presents the following arguments.
First, although franchisees are often perceived as sophisticated business
people, they systematically suffer from a common psychological bias:
over-optimism about the future. Second, franchisees, being optimisti-
cally biased about the future, repeatedly avoid reading disclosure docu-
ments, which contain informative data about future risks. The
conclusion therefore is that the efficiency of the Franchise Rule in pro-
tecting franchisees is dubious.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A legal war is being waged between the advocates of franchisees
and franchisors. 1 On one side, franchisees' proponents, led mainly by
the American Association of Franchisees and Dealers ("AAFD"),2 ar-
gue that sophisticated franchisors often behave opportunistically to-
wards their less sophisticated franchisees. 3 Specifically, franchisors
are mainly blamed for opening new competing franchise units in too
close proximity to their existing franchisees, or unjustly terminating
the franchise contract only in order to resell the terminated unit to a
new franchisee for higher fees.4 Franchisees' advocates are conse-
quently trying to persuade policy makers in numerous states to enact
laws that protect franchisees against such opportunistic behavior by
their franchisors. For example, in California, a new bill, known as
"Senate Bill 610," was recently enacted in order to protect franchisees
against franchisor abuse.5 Similarly, a new bill in Pennsylvania called
the "Responsible Franchise Practices Bill," was recently proposed in
an effort to protect franchisee against franchisor opportunism. 6 In
Maine, a bill called the "Small Business Investment Protection Act,"
was introduced, which aims to defend franchisees against franchisor
exploitation. 7 Likewise, in Vermont, "House Bill 694" was proposed
as an effort to protect franchisees against franchisor opportunism.8 In
Massachusetts, "An Act Further Regulating Franchise Agree-
1. See infra Part II.
2. See The AAFD Story, AM. Assoc. OF FRANCHISEES AND DEALERS, https://www.aafd.org/
the-aafd-story/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014), for information about the AAFD.
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. Id.
5. Franchises, S. Res. 610, 113th Leg. (Cal. 2014) (enacted).
6. Responsible Franchise Practices, H.R. 1620, 113th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013) (enacted); see
also Nancy Lanard, Pennsylvania HB 1620, the "Responsible Franchise Practices Bill", LANARD
L. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2014, 10:11 AM), http://www.spadealaw.com/blog/2014/02/25/pennsylvania-hb-
1620-responsible-franchise-practices-bill.
7. H.R. Res. 1458, 126 Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2014); see also J. Craig Anderson, Maine Bill Aims
to Protect Franchise Owners, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 28, 2014, available at http://www
.pressherald.com/2014/01/28/franchisee-owners-square-off-against-Corporate-franchisors.over
-proposed-bill; Don Sniegowski, Maine Introduces Groundbreaking Franchise Bill, BLUE
MAUMAU (Feb. 7, 2013, 2:17 PM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/12612/bill-introducedmaine
-protectfranchisees.
8. H.R. Res. 694, 2012 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2012); see also Perry J. McGuire & Nicholas C.
Rueter, Policy and Legislative Updates: Vermont Franchise Relationship/Termination Legislation,
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ments" was introduced with the goal of safeguarding franchisees
against franchisor misconduct. 9 In the same vein, in New Hampshire,
a franchisee protection bill called "The New Hampshire Small Busi-
ness Investment Protection Act" was recently introduced in an effort
to reduce franchisor opportunism towards their franchisees. 10 In
other several states, franchisee protection laws are likely to be intro-
duced in the near future."
On the other side of the battle, franchisors, supported by the in-
tense lobby of the International Franchise Association ("IFA"), 12
strongly resent these laws. 13 Deeply ingrained in franchisor advo-
cates' opposition to such legislation is the belief that the current fed-
eral disclosure legal regime, known as "the Franchise Rule,"
sufficiently protects franchisees against potential franchisor opportu-
nism. 14 According to the Franchise Rule enacted by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"),15 each franchisor is obliged to disclose to po-
tential franchisees - before they sign the franchise contract - informa-
tion indicating risk of future opportunism by the franchisor.16
Equipped with this information, prospective franchisees can allegedly
assess the risks of franchisor opportunism, and therefore protect
themselves, ex ante, against potential abuse by the franchisor. 17
Franchisor advocates' opposition to franchisee protection laws has
been influential in the development of franchise law at this stage of
the legal battle. To date, several states have already refused to adopt
the novel franchisee protection laws.18 For example, in California,
Governor Jerry Brown announced that he has vetoed Senate Bill 610,
SMITH, GAMBRELL, & RUSSELL, LLP (Mar. 2012), http://www.sgrlaw.com/resources/newsletters/
franchise law newsletter/1808/1810/.
9. S. Res. 1843, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 2012).
10. H.R. Res. 1215, 2014 Gen. Court (N.H. 2014) (enacted); see also Don Sniegowski, New
Hampshire Franchisees a No Show for Protection, BLUE MAUMAu (Feb. 7, 2014, 10:22 AM),
http://www.bluemaumau.org/new-hampshire-franchisees-noshow_protection.
11. Anderson, supra note 7.
12. See About IFA, INT'L FRANCHISE Assoc., http://www.franchise.org/aboutifa.aspx (last vis-
ited Dec. 29, 2014), for information about the IFA.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. Id.
15. See About the FTC, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Dec. 29, 2014), for in-
formation about the FTC.
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essentially blocking the bill.19 Similarly, Maine's state senate voted
against the Small Business Investment Protection Act.20
This Article questions the validity of franchisor advocates' central
argument: that the Franchise Rule is sufficient in protecting franchis-
ees against franchisor opportunism. Based on a significant body of
existing empirical research, which has thus been far overlooked in the
legal debate over franchisee protection laws, this Article argues the
following. First, although franchisees are often perceived as sophisti-
cated business people,21 they systematically suffer from a common
psychological bias: over-optimism about the future.22 Second, fran-
chisees, being optimistically biased about the future, repeatedly avoid
reading disclosure documents, which contain informative data about
future risks.23 The conclusion therefore is that the efficiency of the
Franchise Rule in protecting franchisees is dubious.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part II will provide legal con-
text by briefly reviewing the legal battle over franchisee protection
laws while outlining the central argument on which franchisor advo-
cates base their opposition to franchisee protection laws: namely, that
the Franchise Rule sufficiently protects franchisee against franchisor
opportunism. Part III will present the authors' critique of the
franchisor advocates' argument. Part IV provides a brief conclusion.
II. THE WAR OVER FRANCHISEE PROTECTION LAWS - OVERVIEW
A. The Franchisees' Side: The Risk of Franchisor Opportunism
According to franchisee advocates, franchisors inherently have su-
perior economic power and superior bargaining power in the negotia-
19. Don Sniegowski, California's Governor Brown Vetoes Franchisee Bill, BLUE MAUMAU
(Sept. 30, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/14147/californiaE2%80%99sgover
norbrownvetoesfranchiseebill.
20. Don Sniegowski, Maine's Senate Kills Franchise Protection Bill, BLUE MAUMAU (Apr. 4,
2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/13791/maine-senate-killsfranchise.protection-
bill [hereinafter Maine's Senate].
21. See Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The Sigels are not vulnerable consumers or helpless workers.
They are business people who bought a franchise .... "); see also Broussard v. Mieneke Discount
Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 1998) ("By all lights, Meineke franchisees are
independent, sophisticated, if sometimes small, businessmen who dealt with Meineke at arms'
length and pursued their own business interests."); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d 109,
113 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As purchasers of a Subway sandwich franchise, the Spearses '[were] not
vulnerable consumers or helpless workers. They [were] business people who bought a
franchise."').
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
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tion of the terms and conditions of the franchise contract. 24  Such
superiority is sometimes exploited by franchisors behaving oppor-
tunistically towards their franchisees.2 5 Franchisors opportunistic be-
havior can take numerous forms, which are often permitted under the
one-sided franchise contract: First, the franchisor might open a new
unit in close geographic proximity to an existing franchisee to directly
compete with this franchisee.2 6 Such an action, known as "territorial
encroachment," might dramatically reduce the existing franchisee's
profits and in some cases even cause her business failure.27 In addi-
tion, the franchisor may force its franchisees to buy from a specific
supplier at an excessive price.28  In addition, the franchisor may re-
ceive rebates from suppliers at the expense of its franchisees. 29 More-
over, franchisors might opportunistically force one-sided
modifications of agreements on franchisees by threatening to termi-
nate the franchise relationship at will.30 In addition, the franchisor
might opportunistically terminate the franchise contract during its
term only in order to appropriate the profits of a successful franchisee
unit. Such abusive behavior, known as "churning," 31 can take two
24. See, e.g., Peter C. Lagarias & Robert S. Boulter, The Modern Reality of the Controlling
Franchisor: The Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Protections, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 139, 139
(2010) ("franchisors continue to maintain and exploit their systemic economic superiority vis-A-
vis franchisees ... most franchise agreements are drafted by a franchisor's lawyers to benefit the
franchisor in every possible way and are usually presented to franchisees on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis").
25. See Maine's Senate, supra note 20 (Franchise owners have complained "that their busi-
nesses are being stolen or abused by franchisors"); Matt Ellis, Dunkin' Donuts Franchise Owners
Applauds Joint Committee's Efforts for Fair Franchising Legislation, DUNKIN DONUTS INDEPEN-
DENT FRANCHISE OWNERS (May 7, 2012), http://ddifo.org/dunkin-donuts-franchise-owners-ap-
plauds-joint-committees-efforts-for-fair-franchising-legislation/ ("Franchising suffers when
franchisors abuse the power granted them in their franchise agreements and wipe out the equity
that's been built and the personal money that's been invested").
26. See, e.g., W. Michael Garner, A Termination By Any Other Name, BLUE MAUMAU (Feb.
14, 2008, 5:22 PM), http://www.bluemaumau.org/a-terminationbyany-other-name.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Robert Purvin, Franchising Myth Seven: You Lower the Cost of Doing Business
through the Power of Group Purchasing, BLUE MAUMAU (June 13, 2013, 5:36 AM), http://www
.bluemaumau.org/franchising-myth sevenbuying-franchise means you.lowercost-doingbus
iness-through-power-group-purchasing.
29. See id.
30. See Munno v. Amoco Oil Co., 488 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (D. Conn. 1980); Boyd A. Byers,
Making a Case for Federal Regulation of Franchise Terminations -A Return of Equity Approach,
19 IowA J. CORP. L. 607, 621 (1994); Michael J. Lockerby, Franchise Termination Restrictions: A
Guide for Practitioners and Policy Makers, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 791, 833 (1986).
31. See JUSTIN G. LONGENECKER ET AL., SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: LAUNCHING &
GROWING ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 112 (2011); Michelle Hammond, Franchisees Call for
Action on "Churning" and "Good faith" in Government's Franchise Review, SMART COMPANY
(Feb. 11, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.smartcompany.com.au/growth/franchising/30255-franchis-
ees-call-for-action-on-churning-and-good-faith-in-government-s-franchise-review.html.
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central forms: 1) the franchisor might terminate the contract of an ef-
ficient franchisee who fully complies with the franchise contract in or-
der to sell the latter's profitable unit to a new franchisee for higher
franchise fees; 32 and, 2) the franchisor may terminate the contract of
an efficient franchisee simply in order to manage the successful unit
himself.33
Given the risk of franchisor opportunism, franchisee advocates have
been calling on policymakers to enact laws that protect franchisees. 34
For example, in order to protect them against territorial encroach-
ment, franchisee advocates have called on policy makers to enact laws
that restrict the ability of a franchisor to open new units in unreasona-
ble proximity to their existing franchisees.35 Similarly, franchisee ad-
vocates have been calling policymakers to protect franchisees against
opportunistic hold-ups and churning by enacting laws that restrict the
ability of franchisors to terminate a franchisee without showing "good
cause."
36
B. The Franchisors' Side: Reliance on the FTC
Franchise Disclosure Rule
Franchisors, supported by the relentless lobbying by the IFA,
strongly oppose the adoption of franchisee protection laws.37 One
central argument that underlies their opposition is that the FTC
32. LONGENECKER ET AL., supra note 31, at 112; ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE,
THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 271 (2005); Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv. Inc. v. Litton
Microwave Cooking Products, Div., Litton Systems, Inc., 462 A.2d 595, 601 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1983).
33. BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 32, at 271; see also Byers, supra note 30, at 621; Lock-
erby, supra note 30, at 834; David Hess, The Iowa Franchise Act: Towards Protecting Reasonable
Expectations of Franchisees and Franchisors, 80 IOWA L. REV. 333, 334 (1995); Tracey A. Nicas-
tro, Note, How The Cookie Crumbles: The Good Cause Requirement For Terminating A
Franchise Agreement, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 785, 801 (1994); Mark Pruitt, Disclosure and Good
Cause Legislation: "Where's the Beef' in Franchise Regulation?, 90 COM. L.J. 563, 565 (1985);
see, e.g., Maine's Senate, supra note 20 ("Franchise owners ... have complained that their busi-
nesses are being stolen or abused by franchisors.").
34. See supra Part I.
35. See Responsible Franchise Practices, H.R. 1620, 113th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013); see also
H.R. Res. 1458, 126 Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2014); H.R. Res. 694, 2012 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2012).
36. See H.R. 1620, 113th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013); see also H.R. Res. 1458, 126 Leg., 1st Sess.
(Me. 2014); H.R. Res. 694, 2012 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2012).
37. See, e.g., Why Franchisees Should Oppose California Senate Bill 610, Franchise Relation-
ship Legislation, INT'L FRANCHISE Assoc. (July 2014), http://protectcabusiness.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07Why-zees-should-oppose-SB-610.pdf; California Franchise Legislation Defeated,
IFA FRANBLOG (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.ifafranblog.com/california-franchise-legislation-de-
feated/; see also Andrew A. Caffey, The Proposed Uniform Franchise Act: The Franchisor View-
point, 5 FRANCHISE L. J. 7, 7 (1986) ("The IFA insists . . . on a simple legislative principle: that
government should not intrude in the free marketplace unless there are compelling reasons").
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Franchise Rule sufficiently protects franchisee against franchisor
opportunism. 38
The Franchise Rule is a pre-sale disclosure rule that requires each
franchisor to provide potential franchisees with a franchisor disclosure
document ("FDD") before they sign the franchise contract. 39 The
FDD contains information - in twenty-three distinct disclosure items
- regarding franchisor current policies and past conduct. 40 This infor-
mation is intended to allow franchisees to evaluate the future risks of
franchisor opportunism. 41 For example, in order to allow franchisees
to assess the risk of opportunistic territorial encroachment, the FDD
must include the following details. First, the franchisor must disclose
whether it grants exclusive territory to its franchisees. 42 Second, if a
franchisor does not offer its franchisees exclusive territory, the
franchisor must include a prescribed statement underscoring that
point, and a warning about the consequences of purchasing a franchise
in a non-exclusive territory.43 Specifically, the franchisor must warn
the franchisee that she "may face competition from other franchisees
[in the future], from outlets [the franchiser] own[s], or from other
channels of distribution or competitive brands [that the franchisor]
control[s]. ' '44 Third, if the franchisor grants exclusive territory, it must
38. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH No. 17, FRANCHISE PROTECTION: LAWS
AGAINST TERMINATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL FRANCHISES 32 (A.B.A.
1990); Donald P. Horwitz & Walter M. Volpi, Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 54 St.
JOHN'S L. REV. 217, 249 (1980); Nicastro, supra note 33, at 806; Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise
Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 Bus. LAWYER 289, 314 (1989); William L.
Killion, The Modern Myth of the Vulnerable Franchisee: The Case for a More Balanced View of
the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 23, 29 (2008); Andrew A. Caffey, The
Proposed Uniform Franchise Act: The Franchisor Viewpoint, 5 FRANCHISE L.J. 7, 7 (1986);
Pruitt, supra note 33, at 567-68; Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
on Proposed Small Business Franchise Act, A.B.A. 7, (Dec. 13, 1999), available at http:/www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust-awreport-2ee95b.authcheckdam
.pdf; Bill Buckley, Franchise Owner 'Protections' Will Hurt a Rare Bright Spot in Today's Econ-
omy, BAGOR DAILY NEWS (May 26, 2015, 2:32 PM), http:/fbangordailynews.com/2014/03/18/
opinion/franchise-owner-protections-will-hurt-a-rare-bright-spot-in-todays-economy; cf. James
A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101,
111 (1991).
39. See Judith M. Bailey & Dennis E. Wieczorek, Franchise Disclosure Issues, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF FRANCHISING 95, 96 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d ed. 2008), for the
history of the Franchise Rule.
40. See Bailey & Wieczorek, supra note 39, at 103-116, for an overview of the FDD items.
41. FTC Issues Updated Franchise Rule, FTC (Jan. 23, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2007/01/ftc-issues-updated-franchise-rule.
42. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(1)(5) (2015).
43. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions, Concerning Franchising and Business Oppor-
tunities, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 15,491 (Mar. 30, 2007) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436 & 437).
44. 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(l)(5)(i).
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disclose the circumstances that permit the franchisor to modify the
franchisee's territorial rights in the future.45
Furthermore, in order to allow the potential franchisee to assess the
future risk of opportunistic hold-ups and churning by their franchisor,
the FDD must contain the following details. First, the franchisor must
summarize the conditions under which it may terminate the franchise
contract. Specifically, if the franchisor has a right to terminate the
contract at-will, it must disclose this right in a specified tabular for-
mat.46 Second, the FDD must disclose the yearly rate of franchisees
that were terminated in the past by their franchisor. 47 Third, the
franchisor must disclose contact information of former franchisees
that were terminated by the franchisor.48 This information is intended
to allow prospective franchisees to investigate the causes for past ter-
mination of franchisees, and therefore assess the future risks of oppor-
tunistic termination by the franchisor.49
In order to assist franchisees to effectively assess the risks of
franchisor opportunism, the Franchise Rule furthermore requires that
the FDD meet several formal standards. First, the language of the
FDD must be clear.50 The FDD must use plain English, namely" a)
"understandable by a person unfamiliar with the franchise business";
b) "incorporate[ing] short sentences; definite, concrete, [and] ... ac-
tive voice"; c) excluding "legal jargon, highly technical business terms,
and multiple negatives. '51 Second, the FDD must be concise.52 It
should not include any information other than that required or per-
mitted by the Franchise Rule.5 3 Third, the disclosed information must
be assembled. In other words, the franchisor must disclose all re-
45. § 436.5(l)(5)(ii).
46. § 436.5(q) & Item 17 Table.
47. § 436.5(t) & Item 20, Table No. 3.
48. § 436.5(t)(5).
49. Mario Herman, Don't Be a Victim of Franchise Fraud, aka, Churning - Understanding
Item 20 Part 2, http://www.franchiseknowhow.com/legal-corner/churning2.htm (last visited May
15, 2015) ("[A] careful review of Item 20 [of the Franchise Rule] can disclose some red flags
which might help to prevent you from falling victim to franchise ... churning. Is there a high
turnover rate? What are the reasons for the turnover rate?"); see Look before You Leap: A
Guide to Buying a Franchise, CAL. DEP'T OF CORPS. 5 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.dbo.ca
.gov/Licensees/franchise investment law/pdflLookBeforeYouLeapENG.pdf ("Questions to
ask a former franchisee: If there was a termination or non-renewal, did the franchisor explain
why... ?").
50. 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(b).
51. § 436.1(o).
52. § 436.6(b).
53. § 436.6(d). "For example, franchisors may not include testimonials or promotional litera-
ture in a disclosure document." Franchise Rule 16 C.ER. Part 436 Compliance Guide, FTC 122
(May 2008), available at http://www.business.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/bus70-franchise-rule-
compliance-guide.pdf [hereinafter Compliance Guide].
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quired information in a single document, and the disclosure cannot be
done in multiple discrete parts.5 4 Fourth, the FDD must be storable.55
Specifically, "the disclosure[ ] must be in a form that permits each
prospective franchisee to store, download, print, or otherwise main-
tain the document for future reference. '56 Fifth, the FDD must be
complete. It should specifically address each of the twenty-three dis-
closure items set forth in the Franchise Rule.5 7 If a particular disclo-
sure item is not applicable, then a negative response by the franchisor
is required that includes a reference to the type of information the
non-applicable item required to be disclosed.58 Finally, the FDD must
be provided to the franchisee in a timely manner. Specifically, the
franchisee "must receive the disclosure document at least fourteen
calendar days before ... sign[ing] a binding franchise agreement with,
or make any payment to, the franchisor." 59
III. THE THEORETICAL CRITIQUE
A seminal theoretical assumption that underlies the argument that
the Franchise Rule efficiently protects franchisees against franchisor
opportunism is that franchisees are intrinsically rational and are cogni-
tively capable of rationally assessing the future risks of franchisor op-
portunism.60 As the FTC explains, the current federal disclosure
regime is based on the theory that an informed franchisee "can deter-
mine whether a franchise deal is in his or her best interest. ' 61 Like-
wise, the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the FTC explains that the
current disclosure regime is "a cost-effective way to provide material
information to prospective franchisees so they can assess the costs...
54. Compliance Guide, supra note 53, at 121. For example, a franchisor may not list lawsuits
in Item 3 and then provide a link to external documents that explain the suits in great detail.
55. 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(b).
56. Id. For example, when disclosure documents are furnished as an email attachment or
made accessible online, they must be in a format that a prospective franchisee can download
onto a computer, a CD-ROM, or the like. Compliance Guide, supra note 53, at 121.
57. 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(c).
58. Id. For example, if no financing is provided by the franchisor, it should disclose in item 10:
"We do not offer any direct or indirect financing." Compliance Guide, supra note 53, at 121-22.
59. 16 C.F.R. § 436.3(e)(2). Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions, Concerning Franchis-
ing and Business Opportunities, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 15,491 (Mar. 30, 2007) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pts. 436 & 437).
60. See Proposed Franchise Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,294, 57,294 (Oct. 22, 1999) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. § 436) [hereinafter Proposed Franchise Rule]; Bureau of Consumer Protection, Staff
Report to the Federal Trade Commission and Proposed Revised Trade Regulation Rule (16 CFR
Part 436), FTC 6 (2004), available at http:l/www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
staff-report-bureau-consumer-protection-federa-trade-commission-and-proposed-revised-trade/
0408franchiserulerpt.pdf.
61. Proposed Franchise Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. at 57,294 (emphasis added).
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and potential financial risks involved in entering into a franchise rela-
tionship. ' 62 Given the assumption that franchisees can rationally as-
sess the franchise risks, the FTC's long-held conclusion is that
"informed [franchisee] choice is the best regulator of the market. '63
We argue that this conclusion and its underlying rationality assump-
tion are questionable. As will be explained in more detail below, fran-
chisees inherently suffer from a cognitive constraint, known as
optimism bias. In addition, franchisees, being overly optimistic about
the future, systematically avoid reading franchisee disclosure docu-
ments that contain data about future risks.
A. Franchisees Are Optimistically Biased
Empirical studies show that people at various ages, and in various
aspects of life, systematically suffer from an inherent bias: over-opti-
mism. 64 For example, heavy smokers are optimistically biased about
their chances of reaching age seventy-five. 65 Regular smokers are op-
timistically biased about their risk of lung cancer, heart disease, and
emphysema.66 Individuals are optimistically biased regarding their
likelihood of contracting HIV.67 Individuals are optimistically biased
about their chances of having health problems, such as heart attacks
or arthritis.68 Women aged fifty to seventy are optimistically biased
about their risk of getting breast cancer.69 Men aged forty-five to sixty
62. Bureau of Consumer Protection, supra note 60, at 6 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 11.
64. "The optimism bias is defined as the difference between a person's expectation and the
outcome that follows. If expectations are better than reality, the bias is optimistic ...." See Tali
Sharot, The Optimism Bias, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY R941, R941 (2011).
65. Michael Schoenbaum, Do Smokers Understand the Mortality Effects of Smoking? Evi-
dence from the Health and Retirement Survey?, 87 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 755, 758 (1997).
66. Tracy Williams & Valerie A. Clarke, Optimistic Bias in Beliefs About Smoking, 49 AUSTL.
J. PSYCHOLOGY 106, 110 (1997); see also N. D. Weinstein et al., Smokers' Unrealistic Optimism
About Their Risk, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 55, 58 (2005).
67. See, e.g., Meg Gerrard, Final Report, Antecedents of Pregnancy and Pregnancy Attrition in
First Term Women Marines, OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH 55-56 (Nov. 1, 1989), available at
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA216868; R. S. Gold & H. M. Aucote, 'I'm Less at
Risk than Most Guys'. Gay Men's Unrealistic Optimism About Becoming Infected with HIV, 14
INT'L. J. STD AIDS 18, 21-22 (2003); Shelley E. Taylor et al., Optimism, Coping, Psychological
Distress, and High-Risk Sexual Behavior Among Men at Risk of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), 63 J. PERS. SoC. PSYCHOLOGY 460, 469 (1992); J. van der Pligt et al., Per-
ceived Risk of AIDS. Unrealistic Optimism and Self-Protective Action, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY OF HIV INFECTION 39, 54 (J. B. Pryor & G. D. Reeder, eds. 1993).
68. See Christopher Peterson & Mechele E. De Avila, Optimistic Explanatory Style and the
Perception of Health Problems, 51 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 128, 131 (1995); see also Vera
Hoorens & Brain P. Buunk, Social Comparison of Health Risks: Locus of Control, the Person-
Positivity, and Unrealistic Optimism, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 291, 298 (1993).
69. Valerie A. Clarke et al., Unrealistic Optimism and the Health Belief Model, 23 J. BEHAV.
MED. 367, 371-72 (2000).
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are optimistically biased about their risk of getting prostate cancer. 70
Cancer patients who are enrolled in clinical cancer trials are optimisti-
cally biased about the possibility of their cancer being controlled by
drugs administered in the trials.71 Drivers aged sixty-five and above
are optimistically biased about their driving risks.72 College students
are optimistically biased about their risk of being involved in a traffic
accident.73 Motorcyclists are optimistically biased about their risk of
having a serious road accident. 74 College students are optimistically
biased about positive life events, such as liking their post-graduation
job or owning their own home. 75 College students are also optimisti-
cally biased about negative life events, such as having a drinking prob-
lem or being fired from a job.76 Individuals are optimistically biased
about their risk of committing suicide or becoming addicted to
drugs.77 Individuals who had recently applied for a marriage license
are optimistically biased about the longevity of their marriage. 78 Stu-
dents who experienced an earthquake are optimistically biased, a
couple of months after the earthquake, about their risk of being hurt
in a natural disaster.79 Novice bungee jumpers are optimistically bi-
ased about their risk of injury.80
Equally, empirical studies consistently show that business people,
although being often perceived as less vulnerable than non-business
70. Id. at 371-74.
71. Lynn A. Jansen et al., Unrealistic Optimism in Early-Phase Oncology Trials, 33 IRB: ETH-
ics & HUMAN RESEARCH 1, 4 (2011).
72. See Dominique Gosselin et al., Comparative Optimism Among Drivers: An Intergenera-
tional Portrait, 42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 734, 738 (2010); see also Ola Svenson et
al., Perceived Driving Safety and Seatbelt Usage, 17 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 119,
126 (1985).
73. David M. Dejoy, The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accident Risk Perception, 21 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 333, 338 (1989).
74. D. R. Rutter et al., Perceptions of Risk in Motorcyclists: Unrealistic Optimism, Relative
Realism and Predictions of Behaviour, 89 BRITISH J. PSYCHOLOGY 681, 691-692 (1998).
75. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. PERS. SOC. PSY-
CHOLOGY 806, 810-811 & 813 (1980).
76. Id.
77. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems, 5 J.
BEHAV. MED. 441, 446-450 (1982); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility
to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481, 486,
488 (1987).
78. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Percep-
tions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 439, 440 &
446 (1993).
79. Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization of Unrealistic Opti-
mism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to the 1989 California Earthquake,
18 PERS. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 39, 42 (1992).
80. Wendy Middleton et al., Give 'Em Enough Rope: Perception of Health and Safety Risks in
Bungee Jumpers, 15 J. SoC. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 68, 76 (1996).
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people, 81 are optimistically biased too. For example, Cooper, Woo
and Dunkelberg administered a survey to 2,994 entrepreneurs in vari-
ous industries, who had recently become owners of businesses.82 The
entrepreneurs were asked what the odds of their business succeeding
were. 83 They were also asked what the odds of any business like theirs
to succeed were.84 The results show that the entrepreneurs in the
sample were optimistically biased. 85 To begin with, most entrepre-
neurs assessed "their own odds for success as far higher than would
seem justified by the historic experience of new [entrepreneurs]. '86
While the historic experience revealed "less than 50% of businesses
survive for more than five years, '87 entrepreneurs believed, on aver-
age, that their chances of success were 81%.88 In addition, "entrepre-
neurs perceive[d] their prospects for success as substantially better
than those for similar business[ ].-89 While entrepreneurs believed, on
average, that their chances of succeeding were, as mentioned above,
81%, they believed that the chances of any business like theirs to suc-
ceeding were, on average, only 59%. 90
Similarly, Pinfold administered a survey to 548 entrepreneurs "who
had started a business in the previous three months or intended to do
so in the next six months." 91 On average, entrepreneurs estimated
that the probability of their business surviving after five years was
75.7%, while the true rate was approximately 42.5% at that time.92 In
the same vein, in a longitudinal study conducted by Arabsheibani,
Meza, Maloney and Pearson, self-employed individuals were asked to
81. For example, in the legal context, business people are often perceived as less vulnerable
and more sophisticated than members of the general population, such as consumers. See, e.g.,
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1996); Original Great Am. Chocolate
Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992); Susan Saab
Fortney, Seeking Shelter in The Minefield of Unintended Consequences - The Traps of Limited
Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717, 752 n.158 (1997); Harry G. Prince, Uncon-
scionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 459, 460
(1995).
82. Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. Bus. VENTUR-
ING 97, 100-101 (1988).
83. Id. at 102.
84. Id. at 103.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 106.
87. Cooper et al., supra note 82, at 99.
88. Id. at 103.
89. Id. at 106.
90. Id. at 103.
91. John F. Pinfold, The Expectations of New Business Founders: The New Zealand Case, 39 J.
SMALL Bus. MGMT. 279, 280 (2001).
92. Id. at 280 & 281, Table 1.
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forecast their future financial situation.93 The results of the study
show that 4.6 times as many individuals forecast an improvement in
their financial situation, but experienced deterioration, as forecasted
deterioration but experienced an improvement. 94
Within the field of franchising, empirical studies, which have thus
far been overlooked in the legal debate over the effectiveness of the
Franchise Rule, show that franchisees are not different from any other
people. These studies suggest that franchisees, although often per-
ceived as sophisticated business people,95 are systematically too opti-
mistic. For example, an empirical study conducted by Kalnins
suggests that franchisees are unrealistically optimistic regarding their
business capabilities. 96 The study analyzed 142 franchise contracts
with contractual clauses, known as 'development commitments,'
which specify a "number of units to be developed by a ... franchisee
in its territory within a certain time period. ' 97 The study reveals that
61% of master franchisees
did not survive to the end of their development commitment period.
Further, surviving franchisees typically came nowhere near to build-
ing the number of units specified by the development commitments.
Only 6 of the 55 [master franchisees] still ongoing at the end of their
development periods fulfilled or exceeded the commitment size.98
In the same vein, an empirical study conducted by Winter, Szulanski,
Ringov and Jensen suggests that franchisees are optimistically biased
about their business capabilities to uncover and implement novel busi-
ness alternatives, which are superior to the ones provided by their ex-
perienced and knowledgeable franchisor. 99 The study found that
many franchisees deviate from the franchisor's original business
93. Gholamreza Arabsheibani et al., And a Vision Appeared Unto Them of a Great Profit:
Evidence of Self-Deception among Self-Employed, 67 ECON. LET-rERs 35, 36 (2000).
94. Id. at 37.
95. See Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The Sigels are not vulnerable consumers or helpless workers.
They are business people who bought a franchise .. "); see also Broussard v. Mieneke Discount
Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 1998) ("By all lights, Meineke franchisees are
independent, sophisticated, if sometimes small, businessmen who dealt with Meineke at arms'
length and pursued their own business interests."); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d 109,
113 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As purchasers of a Subway sandwich franchise, the Spearses '[were] not
vulnerable consumers or helpless workers. They [were] business people who bought a
franchise."').
96. Arturs Kalnins, Overestimation and Venture Survival: An Empirical Analysis of Develop-
ment Commitments in International Master Franchising Ventures, 14 J. ECON. MGMT. STRAT. 933,
951 (2005).
97. Id. at 933.
98. Id. at 951.
99. See Sidney G. Winter et al., Reproducing Knowledge: Inaccurate Replication and Failure in
Franchise Organizations, 23 ORGAN. Sci. 672, 682 (2012).
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model by providing their customers new products that are not part of
the original model. 100 In addition, the study empirically shows that
franchisee deviation from the franchisor business model increases
their risk of franchisee failure. 10 1
Another empirical study conducted by Grinhagen and Dorsch sug-
gests that franchisees have "unrealistically [optimistic] expectations of
the franchisors" at the time they make a decision to start a
franchise.10 2 Franchisees were asked, among other things, to rate "the
value that [they] expected [to receive] from the franchisor at the time
that the franchise was started. ' 103 These franchisees were also asked
to rate the value they currently are experiencing from the
franchisor.' 0 4 The results, obtained from 206 franchisees from 14
franchise chains,10 5 reveal that franchisees, both single-unit and multi-
unit, reported "significantly stronger, positive perceptions of expected
franchisor value when asked about the time they started their
franchise relative to the ... current value they perceived to be receiv-
ing from their franchisors.' 0 6 Likewise, an empirical study by Blut,
Backhaus, Heussler, Woisetschliger and Ahlert strongly implies that
franchisees are optimistically biased about their potential profits, and
the level of training and support provided by the franchisor.10 7 Col-
lecting data from 2,668 franchisees from 54 different franchise
chains,10 8 the study shows that at the very beginning of the franchise
relationship, franchisees have relatively high levels of loyalty towards
their franchisors, 10 9 measured by their willingness to renew the
franchise agreement and to still purchase their franchise, if they had to
do over again. 10 However, one year into the franchise relation-
ship,11 ' there is a significant decline in the franchisee's loyalty towards
the franchisor.1 2 One explanation for this decline is that at the begin-
100. Id. at 676.
101. Id. at 681.
102. Marko Gruinhagen & Michael J. Dorsch, Does the Franchisor Provide Value to Franchis-
ees? Past, Current, and Future Value Assessments of Two Franchisee Types, 41 J. SMALL Bus.
MGMT. 366, 379 (2003).
103. Id. at 373.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 371-72.
106. Id. at 376.
107. See Markus Blut et al., What to Expect After the Honeymoon: Testing a Lifecycle Theory
of Franchise Relationships, 87 J. RETAILING 306, 309-10 (2011).
108. Id. at 311.
109. Franchisees scored their loyalty intentions as 5.24 out of 7. See id. at 318, Table 4.
110. See id. at 317, Table 2.
111. Id. at 312.
112. Franchisees scored their loyalty intentions as 4.08 out of 7, compared to 5.24 out of 7 at
the honeymoon phase. See Markus Blut et al., supra note 107, at 318, Table 4.
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ning of the franchise relationship, franchisees tend to be euphoric and
over-optimistic about entering a new phase in their working lives. 113
However, following this honeymoon stage, franchisees confront the
harsh reality and realize that the "high level[ ] of expectations towards
profit, training, and support [were unrealistically optimistic]. 1' 14
Qualitative studies furthermore show that franchisees suffer from
an optimism bias. In an empirical qualitative study, conducted by Fra-
zer, Weaven, Giddings and Grace, 115 "[a] series of 11 multiple case
studies, involving 30 protocol discussions with franchisors and fran-
chisees, [were] undertaken." ' 16 Out of 22 total franchisees, 117 a strong
majority of franchisees self-identified that they had initially held un-
realistically optimistic expectations at the pre-entry stages of entering
the franchise system.118 As one franchisee explains: "I really believed
that I would get a good return on my investment and I would have
some flexibility [... ] but it just did not happen.... I could not under-
stand how I got it so wrong."11 9 Unrealistic optimism on the part of
franchisees was also identified by franchisors, interviewed in the
study. For example, one franchisor stated that: "A lot of franchisees
have not reviewed their business operations rationally, and so there is
a gap between what they are expecting and what they actually re-
ceive."1 20 Similarly, another qualitative study conducted by Schell
and McGillis shows that franchisees are optimistically biased about
their sales volume.12' In this study, out of 37 franchisees, the majority
felt that the sales volume of their franchise during its first year of op-
eration was somewhat lower or significantly lower than expected. 122
B. Biased Franchisees Ignore Disclosure Documents
On a theoretical level, optimism bias has potential negative implica-
tions for the willingness of individuals to seek information about their
potential risks: "[p]eople may simply avoid information that might
113. Id. at 309.
114. Id. at 309-310.
115. Lorelle Frazer et al., What Went Wrong? Franchisors and Franchisees Disclose the Causes
of Conflict in Franchising, 15 QUALITATIVE MKT. RESEARCH INT. J. 87, 87 (2012).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 90.
118. Id. at 93.
119. Id. at 95-96.
120. Frazer et al., supra note 115, at 95.
121. Bernadette H. Schell & Sheila McGillis, How Type A Franchisees Cope with Failed Busi-
ness: An Analysis of Micro- and Macro-System Factors, 12 J. SMALL Bus. ENTRE. 27, 29 (1995).
122. Id. at 35-36.
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contradict their optimistic beliefs. ' 123 "If individuals perceive that
particular negative events are less likely to happen to them then it is
possible that they will pay less attention to risk-related informa-
tion." 124 Individuals who are unrealistically optimistic about their
own abilities may not pay much attention to risk information, which
they may feel is mainly directed at other less careful or less skillful
individuals than themselves. 125
Indeed, empirical studies systematically show that people who are
optimistically biased about their risks are less likely to seek informa-
tion about those risks. For example, in an experimental study con-
ducted by Fowler and Geers, subjects who were undergraduate
students 126 were asked to provide their email address if interested in
attending informative seminars on health problems. 127 The study re-
vealed that subjects who were optimistic about their health conditions
''were less likely than other subjects to seek ... health information"
by attending to the informative seminars. 28 In the same vein, in an
empirical study conducted by Radcliffe and Klein, "a sample con-
sist[ing] of 146 subjects between the ages of 40 and 60,"129 were given
a choice to read about one heart-attack risk factor out of six, including
"alcohol consumption, fat consumption, nutrition, smoking, exercise
and stress.' 130 The study shows that subjects who were unrealistically
optimistic about their heart attack risk chose to read about a risk fac-
tor towards which they believed they possessed a favorable standing,
and they chose not to read about risk factors towards which they pos-
sessed less favorable standing.' 3 ' Likewise, according to an empirical
telephone survey, conducted by Lu, Dzwo, Hou and Andrews, 132 sub-
jects who were optimistically biased about the risks of eating food
123. Deborah J. Wiebe & David Black, Illusional Beliefs in the Context of Risky Sexual Behav-
iors, 27 J. APPL. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1727, 1728 (1997).
124. Frank P. McKenna, It Won't Happen to Me. Unrealistic Optimism or Illusion of Control?,
84 BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 39, 44 (1993).
125. See Marleen Decruyenare et al., Adolescents' Opinions about Genetic Risk Information,
Prenatal Diagnosis, and Pregnancy Termination, 32 J. MED. GENETICS 799, 803-04 (1995).
126. Stephanie L. Fowler & Andrew L. Geers, Dispositional and Comparative Optimism Inter-
act to Predict Avoidance of a Looming Health Threat, 30 PSYCHOLOGY HEALTH 456, 461 (2014).
127. Id. at 462.
128. Id. at 465.
129. Nathan M. Radcliffe & William M. P. Klein, Dispositional, Unrealistic, and Comparative
Optimism: Differential Relations With the Knowledge and Processing of Risk Information and
Beliefs About Personal Risk, 28 PERS. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 836, 839 (2002).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 844.
132. Hung-Yi Lu et al., Factors Influencing Information-Seeking Intentions and Support for
Restrictions: A Study on an Aresnic-Contaminated Frying Oil Event, 113 BRITISH FOOD J. 1439
(2011).
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cooked by arsenic-contaminated oil had less intention of seeking in-
formation regarding those risks. 133 Similarly, in an experimental study
conducted by Wiebe and Black,134 subjects "were chosen from never-
married, heterosexual students taking an introductory psychology
course."'1 35 These subjects received an informative pamphlet, which
contained "[data] about contraception as well as about the specific
advantages and disadvantages of several different contraceptives.' '1 36
Prior to reading the pamphlet, the optimistically-biased subjects,
namely participants whose behavioral risk was relatively high and
whose perceived risk were relatively low, 137 reported lower interest in
the pamphlet than did the more realistic subjects. 138
In the same vein, based on a survey with 699 members of an online
consumer panel, a study by Park, Ju and Kim reveals that as consum-
ers are more optimistically biased about the future risk of depression,
they are less likely to seek information about this health problem. 139
More straightforwardly related to the debate over the effectiveness of
the FTC franchise disclosure rule on optimistically biased franchisees,
a recent empirical study by Anh, Park and Haley examined the rela-
tionship between consumers' optimism bias and their inclination to
read mandated legal disclosures. 40 By analyzing survey data of 404
consumers,' 4 ' the study reveals that optimistically biased consumers
are less likely to pay attention to the mandated legal disclosure on
drugs' health risks, which is required by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration ("FDA"). 142 The study furthermore shows that optimistically
biased consumers are less likely to seek further information about the
drug's health risks through alternative sources. 143
Similarly, in the field of franchising, empirical and anecdotal evi-
dence strongly implies that franchisees, being unrealistically optimistic
about future risks, systematically avoid reading the franchisors disclo-
133. Id. at 1442 & 1446.
134. Deborah J. Wiebe & David Black, Illusional Beliefs in the Context of Risky Sexual Behav-
iors, 27 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1727 (1997).
135. Id. at 1729.
136. Id. at 1733.
137. Id. at 1731.
138. Id. at 1744.
139. Jin Seong Park et al., Direct-to-Consumer Antidepressant Advertising and Consumers'
Optimistic Bias about the Future Risk of Depression: The Moderating Role of Advertising Skepti-
cism, 29 HEALTH COMMUN. 586, 589 & 592 (2014).
140. Ho-Young (Anthony) Ahn, Jin Seong Park & Eric Haley, Consumers' Optimism Bias
and Responses to Risk Disclosures in Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) Prescription Drug Advertising:
The Moderating Role of Subjective Health Literacy, 48 J. CONSUM. AFFAIRS 175 (2014).
141. Id. at 182.
142. Id. at 185.
143. Id.
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sure documents, which are aimed to protect franchisees against those
risks. For example, according to an empirical study conducted by
Kimberly Morrison, which is based on data collected by a mailed
questionnaire from 307 U.S. franchisees in various industries, most
franchisees ignore the franchise disclosure documents before investing
in the franchise. 144
This important empirical finding, which casts significant doubt on
the effectiveness of the FTC franchise disclosure rule, is supported by
countless statements by franchise legal experts. For example, Keith
Kanouse, a U.S. franchise attorney boasting twenty-two years of expe-
rience in franchise matters, claims that most prospective franchisees
simply do not read franchise disclosure documents. 145 Similarly, ac-
cording the Franchise Business Law Group, which represents "large,
midsize, and small franchisors,' 1 46 "most franchisees who receive [the]
franchise disclosure document will not read the entire thing."'1 47 In
the same vein, Michael Daigle, who spent more than twenty years as
chief legal counsel for franchisors such as Blockbuster, Quiznos, Bos-
ton Market and Einstein Bagels and also served as Co-Chair of the
International Commercial Transactions, Franchising and Distribution
Committee of the American Bar Association Section of International
Law,148 states that "[t]oo often, franchisees don't read ... disclosure
documents.' 1 49 Also, according to Mitchell Kassoff, who has been
representing both franchisors and franchisees in franchising matters in
all fifty states since 1979,150 many prospective franchisees do not read
144. Kimberley A. Morrison, An Empirical Test of a Model of Franchisee Job Satisfaction, 34
J. SMALL Bus. MOMT. 27, 30, 31, Table 2 (1996). Likewise, qualitative in-depth interviews, con-
ducted by John Clarkin, offer support for the view that prospective franchisees often do not read
a franchise disclosure documents before making their franchise purchase. John E. Clarkin, En-
trepreneurial Opportunities and Performance in Franchising Firms 316 & 328 (2002) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sterling).
145. See Roberta Maynard, Choosing a Franchise, 84 NATION'S Bus. 56, 62R (1996).
146. Franchise Business Law Group 30, YOUTUBE, (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qlclBptzhNM (last visited Dec. 29, 2014); see also Our Clients, FRANCHISE BUSINESS
LAW GROUP, http://www.franchisebusinesslawgroup.com/about-us/clients/ (last visited Dec. 29,
2014).
147. FDD Fundamentals: Item 1, FRANCHISE BUSINESS LAW GROUP http://www.franchisebusi-
nesslawgroup.com/fdd-fundamentals-item-1/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
148. Michael R. Daigle, CHEN6 COHEN, http://www.chengcohen.com/who-we-are/michael-r-
daigle/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
149. Heather Blount, Treat Franchising like Marriage, http://www.sunbeltfoodservice.com
2013/07/04/treat-franchising-like-marriage/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
150. Mitchell J. Kassoff, EVANCARMICHAEL.COM, http://www.evancarmichael.com/Franchises/
2753/summary.php (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
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franchise disclosure documents. 51 In addition, according to David
Kaufmann, who wrote the New York's Franchise Disclosure Law and
served as Special Deputy Attorney General in the Franchise Section
of the New York Attorney General's office, 152 "many prospective
franchisees don't read the franchise disclosure document, cover to
cover."
153
Franchise industry experts too, repeatedly argue that franchisees
systematically ignore franchise disclosure documents. For example,
according to Arnie Williams, who spent 27 years in the franchise busi-
ness at franchisor corporate level,154 states that "being in the business
made it abundantly clear to me that most franchisees do not read their
[franchise disclosure documents]." 155 Likewise, according to Ginny
Wilmerding, a business strategy consultant and a former research as-
sociate at the Harvard Business School, too many franchisees do not
read franchise disclosure documents carefully. 156  Similarly, Tom
Portesy, President and Chief Executive Officer of MFV Expositions, a
company that produces the leading franchise events worldwide, states
that "many franchise prospects do not read the franchise disclosure
document."'' 57 Likewise, according to Eddy Goldberg, Managing Edi-
tor at Franchise Update Media, a leading integrated content provider
in franchising, "many franchisors bemoan the fact that candidates
don't read the [franchise disclosure document]. '158 Finally, a state-
ment by FranNet, a franchisor and franchisee consultant company es-
tablished in 1987, supports the assertion that franchisees, being
151. Is Franchising Highly Regulated, Top Franchisee Attorneys Weigh In, UNHAPPY FRAN-
CHISEE (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.unhappyfranchisee.com/is-franchising-regulated/ (last visited
Dec. 29, 2014).
152. Franchising, Licensing and Distribution: An Overview of Kaufnann Gildin's Franchise
Practice, KAUFMANN GILDIN & ROBBINS, LLP, http://www.kaufmanngildin.com/Franchise-Law/
Franchising-Licensing-and-Distribution.shtm (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
153. Chuck Green & Ben Brody, Benefits and Burdens of Owning a Franchise: Westchester




154. Franchise Players: What 27 Years in the Franchise Industry Taught Me About Becoming a
Franchisee, YAHOO! FINANCE (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/fran
chise-players-27-years-franchise-110000311.html.
155. Id.
156. GINNY WILMERDING, SMART WOMEN AND SMALL BUSINESS: How TO MAKE THE LEAP
FROM CORPORATE CAREERS 89 (2006).
157. Tom Portesy, What Franchisors Expect of Franchisees, FRANCHISE Expo (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://www.franchiseexpo.com/resources/industry-experts/august-2014/What-Franchisors-Ex-
pect-Of-Franchisees.
158. Eddy Goldberg, Getting Legal Advice, FRANCHISING.COM, http://www.franchising.com/
howtofranchiseguide/getting-legal-advice.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
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unrealistically optimistic, systematically ignore franchise disclosure
documents:
It's baffling to think that a franchisee would invest thousands of dol-
lars in a business venture without knowing what he or she was get-
ting into - especially when the law requires franchisors to disclose
detailed information about operations, costs, earning potential and
legal requirements.
But it happens. All the time. People get so excited about their bus-
iness venture that they don't read the Franchise Disclosure Docu-
ment, or just read the Item 7 expenditures and Item 19 earnings
information and skip over the rest. Then they're caught by surprise
later when it's too late. 159
In addition to business experts' statements, anecdotal court cases re-
peatedly show that franchisees, in diverse industries, ignore franchise
disclosure documents. For example, in Ayu's Global Tire v. Big 0
Tires,160 when the franchisee investigated buying a tires store
franchise, the franchisor sent him several copies of its franchise disclo-
sure document. 161 However, the franchisee admitted in his deposition
that he did not read the franchise disclosure document carefully.162
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According to the court, "[the franchisee] did not read any part of the
[franchise disclosure document] other than the cover page.' 65 Simi-
larly, in Massey v. Moe's Southwest Grill, LLC 166 the fast-food fran-
chisee admitted that he did not read the franchise disclosure
document before buying his franchise. 67 Likewise, in TES Franchis-
ing v. Dombach,168 a business coaching franchisee self-confessed that
he did not read the franchise disclosure document. 169
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FRANCHISEES' OPTIMISM BIAS
IV. CONCLUSION
A seminal assumption that underlies current franchise law is that
franchisees are intrinsically rational. As such, franchisees are pre-
sumed to be able to rationally assess the risks involved in the franchise
contract and avoid those risks. Based on this rationality assumption,
current law is predominantly based on the FTC Franchise Rule, in
which franchisors are obliged to disclose to franchisees information
regarding future risks. Equipped with this information, franchisees, as
rational actors, are assumed to be capable of protecting themselves
against franchisor opportunism risks.
This Article questions the validity of the assumption that franchis-
ees are rational actors. Franchisees, although being business people
that make large investments in the franchise, are not different from
other people: they inherently suffer from a cognitive constraint,
known as optimism bias. Being overly optimistic about the future,
franchisees systematically avoid reading franchisee disclosure docu-
ments, which contain information about future risks. Since franchis-
ees, being overly optimistic, persistently ignore disclosure documents,
the efficiency of the FTC Franchise Rule becomes questionable. Con-
sequently, the door should be reopened to considering the adoption of
laws that substantially protect franchisees against franchisor potential
opportunism.
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